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By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean
the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoﬀs for
each coalition being a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players. It is well-
known that balancedness is a suﬃcient condition for the nonemptiness of the core of such
a cooperative non-transferable utility game. In this paper we consider non-transferable
utility games in which for any coalition the set of payoﬀs depends on a permutation or
ordering upon any partition of the coalition into subcoalitions. We call such a game a
cooperative game in permutational structure or shortly permutational game. Doing so we
extend the scope of the standard cooperative game theory in dealing with economic or
political problems. Next we deﬁne the concept of core for such games. By introducing
balancedness for ordered partitions of coalitions, we prove the nonemptiness of the core
of a balanced non-transferable utility permutational game. Moreover we show that the
core of a permutational game coincides with the core of an induced game in coalitional
structure, but that balancedness of the permutational game need not imply balancedness
of the corresponding coalitional game. This leads to a weakening of the conditions for
the existence of a nonempty core of a game in coalitional structure, induced by a game
in permutational strucuture. Furthermore, we reﬁne the concept of core for the class of
permutational games. We call this reﬁnement the balanced-core of the game and show that
the balanced-core of a balanced permutational game is a nonempty subset of the core.
The proof of the nonemptiness of the core of a permututational game is based on a
new intersection theorem on the unit simplex, which generalizes the well-known intersec-
tion theorem of Shapley.
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covering, intersection theorem1 Introduction
It is well-known that balancedness is a suﬃcient condition for the nonemptiness of the
core of the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoﬀs
for each coalition being a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players. In the
following we call such a non-transferable utility game a game in coalitional structure or
shortly coalitional game. We also speak about coalitional balancedness if we mean the well-
known concept of balancedness of a family of coalitions. Scarf [12] gave a constructive proof
of the nonemptiness of the core of a coalitionally balanced game in coalitional structure
based on the complementary pivoting technique introduced by Lemke and Howson [9].
Shapley [13] generalized the intersection theorem of Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz on
the unit simplex in order to prove the nonemptiness of the core, see also Ichiishi [5]. In
Billera [3] balancedness of a coalitional game has been generalized to π-balancedness of
such a game.
In this paper we generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility
game to a non-transferable utility game in which for any nonempty coalition a (possibly
empty) set of attainable payoﬀs is given for any permutation or ordering upon a partition
of the coalition into subcoalitions. This dependency on an ordered partition of the coalition
reﬂects the situation in which the payoﬀ set of a coalition is determined by the sequence in
which the coalition is formed or on any hierarchy of the members of the coalition. In this
way it is possible to diﬀerentiate between the players in the coalition, for instance between
the player who takes the initiative to form the coalition, or is the most powerful player
in the coalition, and the other players in the coalition. Another example is a situation
when there is need for players to stand in a queue in order to get their payoﬀ and waiting
costs are involved. In such an environment it is necessary to diﬀerentiate the players in
a coalition according to all the orderings of subsets of the coalition. Also for scheduling
problems the outcome depends very much on the ordering of machines (i.e., players) to be
processed.
Nowak and Radzik [11] have considered games in permutational form in case of
transferable utilities and only permutations on the set of elements of a coalition are consid-
ered. For such TU games the value of the characteristic function depends on the ordering
of the members of the coalition. Nowak and Radzik generalize the concept of the Shapley
value for such games. We also refer to the work of Myerson [10], who used undirected graphs
to model communication structures in cooperative games. In this paper we consider non-
transferable utility games with payoﬀ sets for any permutation upon each possible partition
of the coalitions. We call such a game a non-transferable utility game in permutational
structure or shortly permutational game. The core of a permutational game consists of
all payoﬀ vectors attainable for the grand coalition such that there is no coalition having
1a partition and permutation on the elements of this partition through which the coalition
can improve upon the payoﬀs of all players in the coalition. Generalizing the concept of
coalitional balancedness to balancedness for ordered partitions of coalitions, we prove the
nonemptiness of the core of a balanced permutational game by applying a new intersection
theorem on the unit simplex. Moreover we prove that the core of a permutational game
coincides with the core of an induced game in coalitional structure. We also give an exam-
ple showing that balancedness of the permutational game does not imply balancedness of
the corresponding coalitional game. This therefore leads to a weakening of the conditions
for the existence of a nonempty core of a game in coalitional structure. Next we reﬁne the
concept of core for a permutational game and show that for balanced permutational games
this reﬁnement is a nonempty subset of the core. We call this reﬁnement the balanced-core
of the game. By some examples we demonstrate that the balanced-core is indeed a proper
subset of the core.
In Section 2 we introduce the concept of non-transferable utility permutational
game. We also deﬁne for any permutational game an induced coalitional game and show
that the core of the permutational game coincides with the core of the induced coalitional
game. In Section 3 we deﬁne the concept of permutational balancedness and show that per-
mutational balancedness of a permutational game does not imply coalitional balancedness
of the induced coalitional game. In Section 4 we prove that balancedness of a permuta-
tional game is a suﬃcient condition for the nonemptiness of the core. This proof follows
from a new intersection theorem on the unit simplex. If the induced coalitional game is not
balanced, the nonemptiness of the core of this game follows from the nonemptiness of the
core of the permutational game. In Section 5 we introduce the concept of balanced-core of
a permutational game. In Section 6 we make some concluding remarks.
2 Permutational games
In an n-player cooperative non-transferable utility game introduced by Aumann and Peleg
[2] each nonempty subset of players, called a coalition, can obtain any vector out of a certain
subset of IR
n as payoﬀ vector. An attainable payoﬀ vector lies in the core of the game if
no coalition can improve upon this vector, see Aumann [1]. In this paper we introduce a
cooperative non-transferable utility game in which the set of payoﬀ vectors of a coalition
is allowed to depend on the permutation or ordering on a partition of subcoalitions of the
players in the coalition.
The set {1,...,n} of the n players in the game is denoted by N. For a nonempty
subset S of N, called a coalition of players, let P t
S denote a partition {S1,...,S t} of S
into t subcoalitions of S and let π(Pt
S)=( π1(Pt
S),...,π t(Pt
S)) denote a permutation or
2ordering of the elements of P t
S. In the sequel a partition into t subcoalitions is called a
t-partition and a permutation π(Pt
S)o nat-partition of S is called an ordered t-partition of
S. Furthermore, let Πt
S be the set of all ordered t-partitions of S and let ΠS be the union
over t =1 ,...,sof all the sets Πt
S,w h e r es = |S| denotes the number of elements of the
set S. Finally, let PN denote the set of all ordered partitions of subsets of N,i . e . ,
P
N = ∪S⊂NΠS.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Permutational Game
A non-transferable utility game in permutational structure or permutational game with n
players is a function V from PN to the collection of subsets of IR
n satisfying that for every
π(Pt
S) ∈P N, the set V (π(Pt
S)) ⊂ IR
n is a cylinder in the sense that for any two vectors
u and v in IR
n with ui = vi for all i ∈ S, it holds that u ∈ V (π(Pt
S)) if and only if
v ∈ V (π(Pt
S)).
In the sequel we denote a permutational game with n players and function V by the pair
(PN,V). We call V the payoﬀ function of the game (PN,V). If u ∈ V (π(P t
S)) for some
t-partition {S1,...,S t} of the coalition S, the members of S can guarantee themselves a
payoﬀ ui for member i ∈ S, independent of what the players outside the coalition do, by
agreeing on the permutation π(P t
S)o ft h et-partition Pt
S = {S1,...,S t} of S.I n c a s e S
is the grand coalition N, V (π(P t
N)) denotes the set of payoﬀ vectors the players of the
grand coalition can guarantee themselves when the players coordinate according to the
permutation π(Pt
N). For ease of notation we deﬁne for any S ⊂Nthe set of payoﬀs V (S)
by V (S)=V (π(P1
S)), i.e., V (S) is the set of payoﬀ vectors the coalition S can guarantee
itself without partitioning itself into subcoalitions.
For any permutational game (PN,V), let the function V   from the collection of
subsets of N to the collection of subsets of I R
n be deﬁned by
V
 (S)=∪π∈ΠSV (π), S ⊂N.
Then the function V   induces a non-transferable utility n-player game in coalitional struc-
ture, denoted by (N,V ). Observe that V (S) ⊂ V  (S), but that generally V  (S)i sn o t
equal to V (S). Moreover in Deﬁnition 2.1 we allow for empty payoﬀ sets. Hence, it might
be possible that some of the payoﬀ sets V  (S) are also empty. The core of the induced
coalitional game (N,V ), denoted by C(N,V ), is as usual deﬁned by the set of vectors
u ∈ V  (N) such that there do not exist a coalition S ⊂Nand a vector v ∈ V  (S) such
that vi >u i for all i ∈ S. Analogously we say that a payoﬀ vector u i si nt h ec o r eo ft h e
permutational game if u ∈ V  (N) and there is no permutation π(Pt
S)o fat-partition of a
coalition S in which the coalition S can improve upon u.
3Deﬁnition 2.2 Core of a Permutational Game
The core of a non-transferable utility permutational game (PN,V) is the set of vectors
u ∈ IR
n satisfying that u ∈ V  (N) and there do not exist a coalition S with ordered
partition π(Pt
S) ∈P N and a vector v ∈ V (π(Pt
S)) such that vi >u i for all i ∈ S.
Observe that a core element is an element of V  (N) because any vector u lying in a set
V (π(P t
N)) of some permutation of some t-partition P t
N of the grand coalition is attainable
and hence the payoﬀ set of the grand coalition is not restricted to the set V (N). In the
sequel we denote the core of a permutational game (PN,V)b yC(PN,V). Now we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3 Equivalence of Cores
For any permutational game (PN,V) and the induced coalitional game (N,V ) it holds
that C(PN,V)=C(N,V ).
Proof.
For some u ∈ IR
n,ﬁ r s ts u p p o s eu  ∈ C(N,V ). Then there exists a coalition S ⊂Nand
a vector v ∈ IR
n such that v ∈ V  (S)a n dvi >u i for all i ∈ S. By the deﬁnition of
V  (S) this implies that there is some ordered partition π(P t
S) such that v ∈ V (π(P t
S)).
Hence u  ∈ C(PN,V). Secondly, suppose that u  ∈ C(PN,V). Then there exist an ordered
partition π(Pt
S) of some coalition S and some vector v ∈ V (π(P t
S)) such that vi >u i for
all i ∈ S. By deﬁnition we have that v ∈ V  (S). Hence u  ∈ C(N,V ). 
We conclude this section with an example of an economic situation which can be
modelled as a permutational game.
Example 2.4
We consider a ﬁrm with n employees. These employees have to perform all kinds of work,
ranging from manual work (unskilled labour) to managerial work (high skilled labour).
The employees have also diﬀerent levels of skills. The problem is to which tasks which
employees should be assigned. A coalition S denotes the set of employees getting a job,
while the members outside S will be ﬁred. Given a coalition S, the total amount work can
be splitted up in t diﬀerent tasks, with t ranging from 1 to |S|.F o r t =1 , each member
of the coalition has to do the same task, including all types of work. So, in this case each
member has to do for example both manual work and managerial work. For t = |S|,t h e
work to be done is splitted up in specialized tasks as far as possible and all members of S
have diﬀerent tasks. Generally, for 1 ≤ t ≤| S| we have t diﬀerent tasks. To each task
a group of employees of the set S will be assigned, yielding an ordered t-partition P t
S of
4S. So, each member of S is assigned to precisely one task. We assume that these groups
are ordered in such a way that the members of ﬁrst group in this ordering are performing
the most skilled labour and the members of the last group are performing the lowest skilled
labour. The proﬁt of the ﬁrm will depend on the ordered t-partition of subcoalitions and
will be higher if the higher educated employees are asigned to the tasks needing more skills.
Moreover it is assumed that the marginal utility of money for an employee in S depends on
the task to which he is assigned. For instance, a high-skilled worker is more satisﬁed and
therefore has a higher marginal utility of money when he is assigned to high-skilled tasks
than when he is assigned to low-skilled tasks. For the permutation π(Pt
S), let the number
bi(π(P t





S)), i ∈ S.F u r t h e r m o r e ,l e tR(π(P t
S)) denote the proﬁt if
the tasks are divided according to π(P t
S). Finally, we assume that every employee has an
outside option giving him payoﬀ zero and that the ﬁrm can not be run by the employees if
the assignment of the tasks is such that losses are made. Then the payoﬀ sets are given by
V ({i})={x ∈ IR
n | xi ≤ 0}, i ∈N,





















For illustration, take N = {1,2} and let the data be given as in the following table.





The payoﬀ sets corresponding to these data are drawn in Figure 1. The core of this game
consists of all nonnegative elements on the boundary of V  ({1,2}),s oC(PN,V)={x ∈
IR
2+ | x2 =4 −4x1 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 2
5, x2 =3 −3x1
2 if 2
5 ≤ x1 ≤ 3
2, x2 =3 /2− x1
2 if 3
2 ≤ x1 ≤ 3}.
3 Balanced permutational games
The core of a non-transferable utility permutational game might be empty. However, it will
be shown that the core is nonempty if the permutational game satisﬁes some balancedness
5Figure 1: Example 2.4, the payoﬀ sets of the ordered partitions of {1,2}
6condition and every set V (π(P t
S)), π(P t
S) ∈P N, is comprehensive, closed and bounded from
above in its projection space I R
S deﬁned by I R
S = {(xi)i∈S|x ∈ IR
n}. The balancedness
condition diﬀers from the well-known concept of balancedness of coalitions, in the sequel
to be called coalitional balancedness. In this section we introduce the concept of permu-
tational balancedness for ordered partitions of coalitions and deﬁne the related concept of
a permutationally balanced game. Moreover we show by an example that permutational
balancedness of the permutational game does not imply coalitional balancedness of the
induced coalitional game. Since it will be proved in Section 4 that balancedness of the
permutational game is suﬃcient for the nonemptiness of the core, it also follows that it is
suﬃcient for the nonemptiness of the core of a coalitional game induced by a permutational
game that the underlying permutational game is balanced.
First, for some coalition S ⊂Nand permutation π(Pt
S)o fat-partition of S,w e











2(t − r +1 )
t(t +1 ) sr
,i fj ∈ πr(P
t
S),
where sr = |πr(Pt





j = 1. Furthermore, let m denote the vector
all of whose components are equal to n−1, i.e., m = mπ(P1








Sj)), j ∈{ 1,...,k},t h ev e c t o rmπ(Pt
S) can be seen as the
power vector of the members of coalition S in the ordered partition. Each member in a
same subcoalition is assigned with the same power. The power of a subcoalition being the
sum of the powers of its members depends on the rank of the subcoaliton in the ordering,
in such a way that the power of a subcoalition π
j
h(P tj
Sj) is a fraction
tj−h+1






Take n =3and consider the ordered 2-partition π(P 2




3,0) . For the ordered 3-partition π(P 3





6) . The ordered 2-partition π(P 2





3)  and the ordered 2-partition π(P 2





Observe that only the components j ∈ S of the vector mπ(Pt
S) get a positive power, the powers
of two components is equal if they are in the same subset of the partition and that the total
power of the components in some subset becomes greater if the subset has a higher priority
in the ordering.
7Deﬁnition 3.2 Permutational Balancedness
A family B = {π1,...,π k} of k ordered partitions in PN is permutationally balanced if
there exist positive numbers λ∗








Permutational balancedness of a family B of k ordered partitions π1(Pt1
S1),...,π k(P tk
Sk)i n
PN means that to any ordered partition πj(P tj
Sj), j =1 ,...,k,aw e i g h tλ∗
j can be assigned
in such a way that the total power of every player i ∈Nis the same and therefore equal
to mi = 1
n. Geometrically it means that B is permutationally balanced if and only if the
vector m lies in the relative interior of the convex hull of the vectors m
πj(Ptj
Sj), j =1 ,...,k.





Take n =3 . Then the family {π1,π 2,π 3} of two ordered 2-partitions and one 1-partition
given by π1 =( {1},{2}), π2 =( {2},{3}) and π3 =( {3}) is permutationally balanced.
Since mπ1 =( 2
3, 1
3,0) , mπ2 =( 0 , 2
3, 1
3) ,a n dmπ3 =( 0 ,0,1) , this family is permutational






4. Observe that the ordered 2-partition
({1,2},{3}) of N is permutationally balanced, but that the family of the ordered 2-partition
({1},{2}) and the ordered 1-partition ({3}) is not permutationally balanced.
In case B is a family of 1-partitions we have that πj(Ptj
Sj)=( Sj) and hence the










|Sj| if h ∈ Sj and mSj
h =0i fh  ∈ Sj, which is equal to the well-known
concept of coalitional balancedness of the family of subsets {S1,...,Sk} of N. Therefore,
the concept of permutational balancedness contains the concept of coalitional balancedness
for a family of 1-partitions as a special case.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Balanced Permutational Game
A non-transferable utility permutational game (PN,V) is permutationally balanced if for







8In the sequel we speak shortly about a balanced permutational (or coalitional)
game if we mean a permutationally (coalitionally) balanced non-transferable utility per-
mutational (coalitional) game. For a given permutational game (PN,V) any vector in the
set V  (S) is attainable for coalition S. Since V (S) ⊂ V  (S), and generally V  (S)  = V (S),
the induced coalitional game (N,V ) need not to be coalitionally balanced if (PN,V)i t s e l f
is permutationally balanced. This fact is shown in the next example.
Example 3.5
Take n =3and deﬁne the permutational game (PN,V) by
V (i)={x ∈ IR
3 | xi ≤ 0}, i =1 ,2,3,
V (1,2) = {x ∈ IR
3 | 2x1 + x2 ≤ 3},
and
V (2,1) = {x ∈ IR
3 | x1 +2 x2 ≤ 3},
where V (i) denotes V ({i}) and V (i,j) denotes V (({i},{j})). Furthermore,
V (N)=V (3) ∩ V (1,2) ∩ V (2,1),
and
V (π)=∅, otherwise.
Observe again that we allow for empty payoﬀ sets. The induced coalitional game is given
by
V
 ({i})=V (i), i =1 ,2,3,
V








The projection of the sets V (1,2) and V (2,1) on the (x1,x 2)-space is given in Figure 2.
The shaded area in this ﬁgure is the projection of the set V ({1,2,3})=V  ({1,2,3}) on the
(x1,x 2)-space. Both the permutational game (PN,V) and the coalitional game (N,V ) have
the point (1,1,0)  as the unique core element. For the permutational game this point lies
9in V (N) and there is no coalition having an ordered partition through which the coalition
can improve upon this outcome. The coalition {1,2} can improve on each other point in
V (N) through the ordered 2-partition ({1},{2}) or the ordered 2-partition ({2},{1}). Also
for the coalitional game the outcome (1,1,0)  is the unique element of V  (N) on which the
coalition {1,2} cannot improve upon. Clearly the coalitional game is not balanced, since the
family of coalitions {1,2} and {3} is coalitionally balanced, whereas the point x =( 1
2,2,0) 
lies in V  ({1,2})∩V  ({3}) but not in V  (N). On the other hand the permutational game is
permutationally balanced. In fact there are only four relevant families of ordered partitions
to consider, namely the family of the three ordered 1-partitions ({1}), ({2}), ({3}),t h e
family of two ordered 2-partitions and one ordered 1-partition ({1},{2}), ({2},{1}), ({3}),
the family of one ordered 2-partition and two ordered 1-partitions ({1},{2}), ({2}), ({3}),
and the family of one ordered 2-partition and two ordered 1-partitions ({2},{1}), ({1}),
({3}). For each of these families we have that the intersection of the sets of payoﬀs of the
members of the family is a subset of V  (N),f o ri n s t a n c eV (1,2) ∩ V (2) ∩ V (3) ⊂ V  (N).
For all other permutationally balanced families we have that the intersection of the payoﬀ
sets of the members of the family is empty and hence is a subset of V  (N).
4 Nonemptiness of the core of a balanced permuta-
tional game
In order to prove the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced permutational game we ﬁrst






In this theorem the simplex ∆ is covered by closed subsets Cπ, π ∈P N, satisfying some
boundary condition. Under this condition there exists a balanced collection of permutations
for which the corresponding subsets of ∆ have a nonempty intersection. This is stated in
the next lemma, which is a generalization of the well-known intersection theorem of Shapley
[13], in which only sets CS are deﬁned for coalitions S ⊂N . The lemma is also closely




S) | π(P t
S) ∈P N} be a collection of closed sets covering ∆ satisfying that if x
lies in the boundary of ∆ and x ∈ Cπ(Pt
S), then S ⊂{ i ∈N|xi > 0}.T h e n t h e r e i s
10Figure 2: Example 3.4, balanced permutational game








For any ordered partition π ∈P N, deﬁne the vector cπ = m − mπ.F o rx ∈ ∆, deﬁne the
set F(x)b y
F(x) = Conv({c
π | x ∈ C
π}),
where Conv(X) denotes the convex hull of a set X ⊂ IR
n. Clearly, for every x ∈ ∆, the
set F(x) is nonempty, convex, and compact. Moreover, ∪x∈∆F(x) is bounded and F is an
upper hemi-continuous mapping from the set ∆ to the collection of subsets of the set Y n
deﬁned by
Y
n = {y ∈ IR
n | m
 y =0a n dyi ≥− 1f o ri =1 ,...,n}.
Both sets ∆ and Y n are nonempty, convex, and compact. Next, let G be the mapping
from Y n to the collection of subsets of ∆ deﬁned by
G(y)={x ∈ ∆ | x
  y ≤ x
 y for every x
  ∈ ∆}.
Clearly, for every y ∈ Y n the set G(y) is nonempty, convex, and compact, and G is up-
per hemi-continuous. Hence, the mapping H from the nonempty, convex, compact set
∆×Y n into the collection of subsets of ∆×Y n deﬁned by H(x,y)=G(y)×F(x)i su p p e r
hemi-continuous and for every (x,y) ∈ ∆ × Y n,t h es e tH(x,y) is nonempty, convex, and
compact. According to Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem the mapping H has a ﬁxed point
on ∆ × Y n, i.e., there exist x∗ ∈ ∆a n dy∗ ∈ Y n satisfying y∗ ∈ F(x∗)a n dx∗ ∈ G(y∗).
Let α∗ = x∗ y∗.F r o mx∗ ∈ G(y∗)i tf o l l o w st h a tx y∗ ≤ α∗ for every x ∈ ∆. By taking
x = e(i), where e(i)i st h ei-th unit vector, we obtain that y∗
i ≤ α∗, i =1 ,...,n.H e n c e ,
y∗
i = α∗ if x∗
i > 0a n dy∗
i ≤ α∗ if x∗
i = 0. On the other hand, y∗ ∈ F(x∗) implies there









πj, j =1 ,...,k, are such that x∗ ∈ Cπj. Without loss of generality we may assume that
λ∗
j > 0 for every j =1 ,...,k. We now show that y∗ =0and hence that the collection
{π1,...,π k} is permutationally balanced. Since by deﬁnition of the set Y n, m y∗ =0 ,w e
obtain that α∗ ≥ 0. Moreover, by the boundary condition we have that x∗
i = 0 implies that
i  ∈ Sj for every j =1 ,...,k, with Sj the set satisfying πj = πj(P tj












jn−1 > 0. Therefore, 0 <y ∗
i ≤ α∗ if
x∗
i =0a n dy∗
i = α∗ ≥ 0i fx∗
i > 0. Since
￿n
j=1 y∗
i = 0, this implies that x∗
i > 0 for every
i ∈Nand α∗ =0 . S o ,y∗ =0 . Consequently, {π1,...,π k} is permutationally balanced.
12Since x∗ ∈∩ k
j=1Cπj
, this completes the proof. 
By applying Lemma 4.1 we can prove the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced permu-
tational game.
Theorem 4.2
A non-transferable utility permutational game (PN,V) has a nonempty core if
i) the set V ({i}) is given by V ({i})={x ∈ IR
n | xi ≤ αi} for some αi ∈ IR ,
ii) the game is permutationally balanced,
iii) for every S ⊂N and for every π ∈ ΠS, the set V (π) is comprehensive and closed, and
the set {(xi)i∈S ∈ IR
S | x ∈ V (π) and xi ≥ αi for all i ∈ S} is bounded.
Proof.
Without loss of generality we may assume that 0 ∈ V ({i})f o ra n yi ∈N .T o p r o v e
the theorem we deﬁne a closed covering {Cπ | π ∈P N} of ∆ satisfying the conditions of
Lemma 4.1 and show that an intersection point of a permutationally balanced collection
of these sets induces an element in the core of the game. For given M>0a n df o ra n y
x ∈ ∆, let the number λx be determined by
λx =m a x {λ ∈ IR |− Mx+ λm ∈∪ π∈PNV (π)}.
Since 0 ∈ V ({i}) and because of iii), for every M>0, λx exists for any x ∈ ∆. Moreover,
following Shapley [13], by the condition of boundedness from above, M>0 can be chosen
so large that for every i ∈Nand x ∈ ∆, xi = 0 implies that i  ∈ S for any S satisfying
−Mx+ λxm ∈ V (π(Pt
S)). Now, for π ∈P N we deﬁne
C
π = {x ∈ ∆ |− Mx+ λxm ∈ V (π)}.
Since every V (π) is closed and comprehensive, the collection of sets {Cπ|π ∈P N} is a
collection of closed sets covering the simplex ∆, and satisfying the boundary condition of
Lemma 4.1. Hence there is a balanced family B = {π1,...,π k} of elements of PN such that
∩k
j=1Cπj  = ∅.L e tx∗ be a point in this intersection, so x∗ ∈ Cπj for j =1 ,...,k. Since the
game is balanced we have that ∩k
j=1V (πj) ⊂ V  (N) and hence u∗ = −Mx∗+λx∗m ∈ V  (N).
Now, suppose there exist a vector v ∈ IR
n and an ordered partition π(Pt
S) ∈P N of a
coalition S such that v ∈ V (π(Pt
S)) and vi >u ∗
i for all i ∈ S. Since V (π(Pt
S)) is com-
prehensive and cylindric, there is a µ>0 such that u∗ + µm ∈ V (π(P t
S)). However, then
−Mx∗ +(λx∗ +µ)m ∈ V (π(Pt
S)), which contradicts that −Mx∗ +λm  ∈ V (π(P t
S)) for any
λ>λ x∗.H e n c eu∗ ∈ C(PN,V). 
135 Balanced-core of permutational games
For permutational games the concept of the core can be reﬁned to what we will call the
balanced-core. The balanced-core consists of all elements of the core that can be sup-
ported by a balanced collection of ordered partitions of coalitions and will be denoted by
BC(PN,V). We show that the balanced-core is nonempty if the game is permutationally
balanced. In case the permutational game happens to be a coalitional game its balanced-
core is equal to the core. In general the balanced-core of a permutational game is a proper
subset of the core of this game, and so the balanced-core of a permutationally balanced
game is a nonempty subset of its core.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Balanced-core
The balanced-core of a non-transferable utility permutational game (PN,V) is the set of all
vectors u ∈ V  (N) satisfying that
i) for any S ⊂N , there do not exist an ordered partition π(Pt
S) ∈P N and a vector
v ∈ V (π(Pt
S)) such that vi >u i for all i ∈ S,
ii) there exists a permutationally balanced family {π1,...,π k} of k ordered partitions in
PN, such that u ∈∩ k
j=1V (πj)).
Clearly, it follows immediately from condition i) of Deﬁnition 5.1 that a payoﬀ vector in
the balanced-core lies also in the core of the permutational game. Condition ii) says that
an element of the core is an elememt of the balanced-core only if it lies in the intersection
of the payoﬀ sets of a balanced collection of ordered partitioned coalitions. One could
say that a core element lies in the balanced-core if it is supported by a balanced family
of ordered partitions of coalitions. Since every player participates with equal weight in a
balanced family of coalitions this gives some appealing stability property to the elements in
the balanced-core. All players have an equal weight in supporting a balanced-core payoﬀ
vector. In some economic situations only one ordered partitioning of a coalition may
actually be formed. In such situations the weight of an ordered partitioned coalition in the
permutationally balanced family of ordered partitioned coalitions supporting the balanced-
core element selected as the outcome can be interpreted as the probability with which the
ordered partitioned coalition indeed forms. The following theorem is straightforward.
Theorem 5.2
A non-transferable utility permutational game (PN,V) satisfying the conditions i)-iii) of
Theorem 4.2 has a nonempty balanced-core.
Proof.






14for a permutationally balanced collection {π1,..., πk} of elements of PN. Clearly, such an
element u∗ is in BC(PN,V). 
Observe that a permutational game is essentially a coalitional game if for any ordered
partitioning π(Pt
S)w i t ht>1 it holds that V (π(Pt
S)) ⊂ V (S), implying that for the induced
coalitional game it holds that V  (S)=V (S). In this case the balanced-core is equal to the
core, because also V  (N)=V (N). Hence, in this case any core element lies in V (N)a n d
therefore is stable with respect to the permutationally balanced family {N}. However, in
general the set V (N) is a proper subset of V  (N). In this case the core may contain many
elements that do not belong to the balanced-core. This is illustrated in the next examples.
Example 5.3
( i) Consider the permutational game deﬁned in Example 2.4 for n =2 . We have seen
already that the core consists of all nonnegative elements on the boundary of V  (N). How-
ever, the balanced-core is given by BC(PN,V)={x ∈ IR
2+ | x2 =3− 3x1
2 , 2
5 ≤ x1 ≤ 3
2},
with the unpartitioned coalition {1,2} as the unique element of the supporting permuta-
tionally balanced family of coalitions. By giving the players equal votes the unpartitioned
coalition {1,2} forms and the payoﬀ is divided according to some balanced-core element.
( ii) Consider the same example, except that we take R(π(P1
N)) = 1, i.e.,
V ({1,2})={x ∈ IR
2 | 3x1 +2 x2 ≤ 1}.
Then again the core consists of all nonnegative elements on the boundary of V  (N) and is
given by C(PN,V)={x ∈ IR
2+ | x2 =4 −4x1 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 5
7, x2 =3 /2− x1
2 if 5
7 ≤ x1 ≤ 3}.
However, the balanced-core is given by BC(PN,V)={(5
7, 8
7) } and its unique element is
supported by the permutationally balanced family {({1},{2}),({2},{1}) with a weight of 1
2
for both members of this family. Both partitioned coalitions may form with probability 1
2.
(iii) Finally, let the payoﬀ sets be deﬁned by V ({i})={x ∈ IR
2 | xi ≤ 0}, i =1 ,2,
V ({1},{2})={x ∈ IR
2 | x1 + x2 ≤ 2},a n dV ({2},{1})=V ({1,2})=∅. Then
C(PN,V)={x ∈ IR
2+ | x1 + x2 =2 } and BC(PN,V)={(2,0) }. The unique element
of the balanced-core is supported by the permutationally balanced family {({1},{2}),({2})}
w i t haw e i g h to f3/4 for the ordered partition ({1},{2}) of coalition {1,2} and a weight of
1/4 for the one person coalition {2}.
156 Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduced permutational games and proved that the (balanced-)core
of such a game is nonempty if the game is permutationally balanced. This concept of
balancedness is a generalization of the well-known concept of balancedness of coalitions.
Analogously the existence result concerning the nonemptiness of the core is more general
than for games in coalitional structure. A game in coalitional structure is a special case
in the family of games in permutational structure. Indeed, when V (π(Pt
S)) = ∅ for every
t ≥ 2, then the permutational game is a game in coalitional structure and permutational
balancedness coincides with coalitional balancedness. In general the induced coalitional
game (N,V ) of a balanced permutational game, need not to be coalitionally balanced.
Since a permutational game and its induced coalitional game have the same core, it fol-
lows that permutational balancedness of the underlying permutational game is a suﬃcient
condition for the nonemptiness of the core.
Billera [3] has pointed out that in case of coalitional games there are many ways
to deﬁne the powers of the players. In the same way there is a lot of freedom to deﬁne
the powers in case of permutational games. For example, for a given ordered partition
π(Pt
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l for any k ∈ πi(Pt
S)a n dl ∈ πj(P t
S)i f1≤ i<j≤ t. This implies that every
member in a higher ranked subcoalition has always more power than any member in a lower
ranked subcoalition. Notice however that this has consequences in forming permutationally
balanced families and hence on the fact whether or not a game in permutational structure
is permutationally balanced. Since the core of a game does not depend on the deﬁnition
of the power vectors, this implies that for the nonemptiness of the core of a permutational
game it is suﬃcient to have permutational balancedness with respect to some collection
of power vectors. Notice that if we take mπ(Pt
S) = mS for every π(Pt
S) ∈P N, then the
permutational game is balanced with respect to these constant (for every S) vectors if and
only if the induced coalitional game is balanced. Hence, an induced coalitionally game
being balanced implies that the original permutational game is permutationally balanced
with respect to some collection of power vectors. Clearly, the other way around is not true,
i.e., a coalitional game induced by a balanced permutational game may not be coalitionally
16balanced with respect to any set of power vectors. While the core is independent of the
choice of the power vectors, the balanced core does depend on this choice. The choice
of the power vectors should depend on the economic situation under consideration. The
appropriate power vectors in a given application is a point of further research.
In Kamiya and Talman [7] a simplicial algorithm was proposed to ﬁnd a core element
of a coalitional game. Similarly, we can apply the simplicial algorithm on the unit simplex
∆ of Doup and Talman [4] to ﬁnd approximately an element of the balanced-core and so
a core element of a balanced permutational game.
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